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An estimated 70 to 120 million nonhuman animals are 
killed every year in scientific experiments. l The 
justifications for the use of nonhuman animals in 
scientific experiments to benefit humans are based on 
two conflicting paradigms or models regarding the 
nature of human and nonhuman animals. This paper 
will trace the origins of these competing paradigms and 
the assumptions underlying each of them as they relate 
to scientific research. 
According to Thomas Kuhn, in his landmark work 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, when there 
are two competing and incompatible paradigms, one 
of them has eventually to give way to the other.2 
Scientific revolutions, by their very nature, involve 
a shift from an old or traditional paradigm to a new 
paradigm. A paradigm shift, we wiU argue, is 
presently taking place in tlle biological sciences. The 
effect of this shift is currently being experienced in 
the conflict and uncertainty over what policies to 
adopt regarding the use of nonhuman animals In 
scientific experiments. 
1. The Traditional Paradigm 
Underlying "Animal" Experimentation 
The traditional paradigm is based on a pseudo-scientific, 
anthropocentric, religious worldview which fails to 
stand up under philosophical and scientific scrutiny. It 
is based on the premise that there is a distinct line 
separating humans and other animals. Because of this, 
it is perfectly acceptable and even, according to some, 
morally required to use other animals in experiments 
to benefit humans or increase our knowledge. 
The traditional paradigm forms the basis of the 
current approach to biological science, or what Kuhn 
calls "normal science." The term "normal science" 
refers to "research firmly based upon one or more past 
scientific achievements, achievements that some 
particular scientific community acknowledges for a lime 
as supplying the foundation for its further practice."3 
The purpose of education and textbooks is not to 
question or even explicate the basic paradigm, but to 
explain the accepted theories of normal science and to 
illustrate the successful application of these theories. 
In this way, the traditional paradigm is passed on to 
future generations of scientists. Only those who are 
willing to work within the accepted paradigm are 
welcome to participate in the community of scientists. 
Those who question the paradigm of "normal science" 
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or refuse to accept it must either work in isolation or 
join a fringe group. 
The traditional paradigm regarding "animal" 
experimentation was heavily influenced by the Greek 
philosophers, such as Aristotle, who argued that reason 
is an activity of the soul. Only the soul, which is non-
material and hence not restricted by the laws of nature, 
can act freely. Humans have a soul; nonhuman animals 
don't. This paradigm, which was Christianized by 
Thomas Aquinas, foons the basis of what is referred to 
as "traditional morality"-the notion that only humans 
have intrinsic moral value. This philosophical tradition 
has been one of the most deeply rooted obstacles to 
serious consideration of the rights of nonhuman animals. 
According to the Westem Christian/philosophical 
worldview, the universe was created by God primarily 
as a home for humans, who were made in "His" image. 
The earth and all the creatures and other natural resources 
on the earth were put here by God to provide for human 
needs. Because of their special creation, humans alone 
among creatures partake of both the spiritual and 
material realms and, therefore, have a radically different 
nature that sets them apart from other animals. 
"Humans," according to Thomas Aquinas, "are the 
highest in the order of material beings, yet the lowest 
in the order of spiritual beings... the progression from 
the non-living to humans is one of increasing 
perfection ... schematically, humans are at the apex of 
material creation."4 Because we bear the closest likeness 
to God, humans are "highest" among creatures, and 
other animals and "things" are located on the scale 
depending on their resemblance to humans. Because 
animals are "dumb," to use Aquinas's teon, and lack a 
soul, "it is not wrong for man to make use of them, 
either by killing or in any other way whatever."s 
Environmentalist Lynn White maintains that 
Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the 
world has ever seen. "By destroying pagan animism, 
Christianity made it possible to exploit nature in a mood 
of indifference to the feelings of natural objects."6 The 
Westem belief that humans are separate from nature 
and have dominion over nature, he maintains, has 
enabled technological advance at the expense of nature 
and other animals. 
This hierarchical model of the natural order has also 
been used to justify a hierarchy among different groups 
of humans, depending on their perceived level of 
rational activity. Thus, acceptance of the traditional 
paradigm hal) perpetuated not only the exploitation of 
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nonhuman animals as experimental subjects but 
discrimination, in scientific and medical research as well 
as society at large, against women and people of color. 
Again, the male is by nature superior, and the 
female inferior... Where there is such a 
difference as that between soul and body, or 
between men and animals, the lower sort are 
by nature slaves, and it is better for them as 
for all inferiors that they should be under the 
rule ofa master. .. indeed the use made of slaves 
and of tame animals is not very different.? 
With only a few notable exceptions, modem Westem 
philosophers have simply accepted anthropocentrism 
and the privileged status of humans, and men in 
particular, as a matter of fact. Rene Descartes, who is 
acknowledged to be the "Father of Modem Philosophy," 
wrote in his Discourse on Method (1637) that the 
rational soul could not be in any way derived from 
matter and that, therefore, the soul or mind is in its nature 
entirely independent ofbody. Humans are a combination 
ofmindlsoul and body, while animals are entirely body 
and, hence, are merely machines. Even though he 
conceded that some nonhuman animals are capable of 
deceiving the shrewdest humans, Descartes did not take 
this to mean that they have thoughts. Instead, he 
regarded it is as proof that nonhuman animals act 
naturally and mechanically, like a clock which is able 
to give a more accurate reading of the time than is 
human judgment. 
Descartes' philosophy heralded the beginning of the 
scientific revolution. However, despite his underlying 
epistemological principle that one must question 
everything, he did not question the paradigm underlying 
traditional morality but simply disguised the old 
religious language in more scientifically acceptable 
language. TIle immaterial soul is recast as disembodied 
intellect; science and technology now become the God; 
and humans are again given dominion over the earth 
by the new God-Science. By driving a wedge between 
human beings as disembodied intellects and other 
creatures as pure matter, Cartesian dualism permits 
humans to act as though other animals are simply 
"inanimate" resources to be used as we like. 
Legitimating the traditional dualistic paradigm as the 
foundation of modern science was taken one step further 
by Descartes' contemporary Francis Bacon, one of the 
founders of the scientific mcUlod. While claiming UUlt 
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the scientific method has no religious or moral 
significance, Bacon at the same time unquestionably 
accepted the worldview that humans have the right and 
even the duty to manipulate nature and use other animals 
to satisfy human needs. Indeed, Bacon enthusiastically 
advocated vivisection for the purejoy oflearning, without 
need of any moral justification, such as saving human 
lives. Because of the tremendous success of the scientific 
method in generating results and new technologies, and 
because of its claim to be value-neutral, few people 
bothered to question the moral and metaphysical 
assumptions underlying the scientific method. 
Because it assumes a profound separation between 
intellect and body, the traditional paradigm has also 
resulted in free rein to express our intellect while 
simultaneously degrading and stifling emotions and 
instincts. Sigmund Freud, who incorporated the 
assumptions of this paradigm into psychoanalytic 
theory, maintained that in order for human civilization 
to succeed, instincts much be brought under control by 
the mind. 8 Thus scientists, who are called to be 
disembodied intellects in the service of science, 
gradually became numb to the massive suffering of the 
nonhuman animals used in their experimeIlts while at 
the same time being rewarded for seeking knowledge 
for knowledge's sake. "This rational, detached, 
scientific intellect, observing a world of which it is no 
longer a part," environmentalist and U.S. Vice President 
Al Gore notes, "is too often arrogant, unfeeling, 
uncaring. And its consequences can be monstrous."9 
Even the modern existentialists, who rejected much 
of traditional philosophy and ethics, and condemned 
the negative effects of modern science and technology 
on the human psyche, simply accepted without question 
traditional anthropocentric thinking. In a line of 
reasoning that sounds suspiciously reminiscent of 
Aquinas' and Descartes' mind/body dualism, Sartre 
argued that while other animals are born with an essence 
or nature, humans-being free and rational beings-
are nothing but what they make of themselves. In other 
words, with hmnans "existence precedes essence," while 
with all other animals "essence precedes existence."lO 
Once again the disembodied rational intellect won out 
over emotions and instincts which were seen as nothing 
but functions of a mechanistic animal body. 
This prejudice against nonhuman animals has been 
promoted by both Western theologians and philosophers 
who regard evil as something alien to the soul. 
Animals-as well as women cU1d people of color who 
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are regarded as less rational and more "instinctive" and 
emotional than white males-have been used as 
symbols of evil in the Western world ever since the 
serpent tempted Eve in the Garden of Eden. Animal 
welfare philosopher Mary Midgely notes that any evil 
on the part of humans is interpreted as "the debasing 
effect of matter seeping in through instinctive nature. 
This treacherous element clearly cannot be anything 
properly human; it must be described in animal terms. 
And no particular animal at that. .. In short, the Beast 
Within, whose only opponent is the rational soul."l1 
Nonhuman animals are typically portrayed as 
chaotic, uncontrolled and unpredictable, while humans 
are seen as rational and in control. Oddly, nonhuman 
animals, under the traditional paradigm, are at the same 
time held to have the exact opposite nature. They are 
machine-like and tlleir behavior rigid, predetermined 
and governed by instincts. This prejudice is also 
maintained through language that degrades members 
of other species; he's an animal, a beast, a rat, a swine; 
she's catty, mousey, a bitch, a bird-brain. To act 
humanely, on the other hand, is to be kind and noble. 
To be a man is to show courage. Because of the 
assumption that everything other animals do is evil or 
inferior at best, it is concluded that it is morally 
justifiable to restrain them, to impose order on them, 
and to treat tllem as objects to be disposed of and 
experimented upon for the benefit of humans. 
2. Challenges to the Traditional Paradigm 
Challenges to the traditional paradigm have come from 
several fronts including Galileo's discovery that the 
earth is not the center of the universe, Darwinian 
evolutionary theory, Piaget's finding that logical thought 
can occur without language, concern for the rights of 
human subjects following the holocaust of World War 
II, the civil rights movement, and the environmental 
movement. The increasing evidence of irrational human 
brutality, and the alarming acceleration in the past few 
decades of environmental destruction because ofhuman 
activities, including the extinction of thousands of 
species of plants and animals every year, has caused 
many people to rethink the traditional paradigm and to 
realize that humans are not separate from nature but a 
part of nature. It is becoming apparent, as we stand on 
tlle brink of ecological disaster, tllat it is the human 
animal, more tllan any otller, tllat needs to be restrained 
and have order imposed on it. 
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The assumption that the universe was created by 
God for human use was first called into question by 
Galileo's discovery in 1610 that the earth is not the 
center of the universe but just another celestial body, a 
theory which had already been proposed by Copernicus 
in 1543. As a result of his discovery, Galileo was 
charged by the authorities with subversion and heresy. 
Under pressure from the Church, he pleaded that he 
didn't really accept the implications of his discovery. 
With Galileo sufficiently subdued, the traditional 
paradigm based on the assumption that humans hold a 
special place in creation continued as the predominant 
worldview and the keystone of traditional morality. 
The traditional paradigm suffered a further and more 
serious blow 250 years later with the publication of 
Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859. 
Although Darwin had already formulated his theory in 
1838, he was reluctant to publish the results. When the 
book was finally published, it was met with much public 
scorn as well as censure from the church. According to 
Darwin's theory of evolution, differences between 
humans and nonhuman animals were merely differences 
of degree rather than kind. In his later book, The Descent 
ofMan, Darwin argued against the notion that humans 
differ greatly from "animals" because of humans' 
mental powers, pointing out that there is no fundamental 
difference between man and the higher animals in their 
mental faculties. Rather than being a unique and special 
creation, humans evolved from the same ancestors as 
the other animals. According to Kuhn, 
For many men the abolition of the teleological 
kind of evolution was the most significant and 
least palatable of Darwin's suggestions. The 
Origin of!'Jpecies recognized no goal set either 
by God or nature. Instead, natural selection 
was responsible for the gradual but steady 
emergence of more elaborate... specialized 
organisms which were products of a process 
that moved steadily from primitive beginnings 
but toward no goal... What could "evolution," 
"development" and "progress" mean in the 
absence of a specified goal?12 
In other words, if humans are the result of natural 
forces without a plan or purpose, then how can one 
justify a moral theory based on the superiority of 
human nature? If we accept evolutionary biology, then 
there are no fixed essences but a multitude of 
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organisms that resemble one another in some ways 
and not in others. Even within a species, some 
organisms are better adapted and more sentient than 
others. Consequently, moral treaLment should depend 
on the individual qualities rather than an outdated 
notion like species' essence. 
Darwin particularly attacked the assumption that 
only humans are capable of reason. Reasoning by 
definition involves the ability to form general rules from 
particular experiences. That other animals are clearly 
capable ofreasoning seemed obvious to Darwin as well 
as to some of the other naturalists of his time. "Of all 
the faculties of the human mind," he wrote in his book 
The Descent ofMan, 
it will, I presume, be admitted that Reason 
stands at the summit. Only a few persons now 
dispute that animals possess some power of 
reasoning. Animals may constantly be seen 
to pause, deliberate, and resolve. It is a 
significant fact, that the more the habits of 
any particular animal are studied by a 
naturalist, the more he attributes to reason and 
the less to unlearnt instincts. 13 
Unfortunately, Darwin underestimated the power of 
the traditional paradigm in preventing humans from 
seeing rationality in other animals. The belief that 
nonhuman animals are unable to reason, and hence to 
make choices or act freely, was for a long time supported 
not only by religious doctrine but also by the belief that 
language is necessary for the formation of concepts 
which are, in tum, necessary for reason. Descartes, for 
example, argued that because animals lacked speech, 
i.e., were "dumb," a tenn which has come to mean both 
mute and stupid, this showed "not merely that the brutes 
have less reason than men, but that they have none at 
all, since it is clear that very little is required in order to 
be able to talk."14 Therefore, according to Descartes, 
animals are forever trapped in the momentary. 
Much of the success of nonnal science, according 
to Kuhn, lies in its ability to defend its basic 
assumptions, sometimes at considerable cost, and to 
suppress new findings that are seen as subversive and 
not consistent with it's basic worldview or paradigm. IS 
Normal science also defines which problems or 
phenomena should be studied. Kuhn writes: "Perhaps 
the most striking feature of the normal research 
problems we have just encountered is how little they 
Summer & Fall 1994 
Paradigm Shifts. Scientific Revolutions and the Moral Justification ofExperimentation on Nonhuman Animals 
aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or 
phenomenal."16 In line WiUI this, it is amazing how the 
assumption which equates mental concepts with 
language has gone unchallenged for so long. 
Non-linguistic tllinking is a field iliat has barely 
begun to be explored by science despite overwhelming 
evidence for its existence. The hidden cost of 
maintaining iliis assumption, which is basic to ilie 
traditional paradigm, is widespread discrimination 
against small children as well as nonhuman animals. 
While it is true that spoken language or a set of 
conventional signs is a fundamental tool for ilie adult 
human's mental life and formation of concepts, one 
cannot conclude from this iliat language is essential for 
a mental life. In fact, children under ilie age of one or 
two clearly have a mental life. Yet they lack language. "" 
Prior to this century, infants and young children, like 
other animals, were believed to be devoid of a mental 
or cognitive life and, hence, intrinsic moral value. 17 
However, child psychologist Jean Piaget found iliat 
instead of infants being passive and devoid of iliought, 
tlle most rapid cognitive growili and learning in humans 
occurs prior to ilie age of two - and prior to language 
acquisition.18 Indeed, any argument iliatdenies any sort 
of significant thought in the absence of language would 
find it difficult to explain how humans ever acquire 
language in the first place. 
Many nonhuman animals are likewise clearly 
capable of reasoning and remembering. If iliey were 
not, it would be pointless to use them as subjects in 
learning experiments. Nonhuman animals obviously 
have concepts of food and danger, and iliey show 
evidence of having expectations of future events, such 
as rewards and punishments. A recent article in 
Scientific American states that "computers have 
mastered intellectual tasks such as chess and integral 
logic, but tlley have yet to attain ilie skills of a lobster 
in dealing wiili ilie real world." 19 
Behavioral evidence also supports ilie claim iliat 
other animals, like young humans, have memory 
witllOUt language. And memory depends on concept 
formation. Because we don't know how otller animals 
do tllis without a system of conventional symbols does 
not mean tllat tlley don't do it. To use an analogy, if we 
adopted an orniiliocentric or bird-centered worldview, 
we might claim tlmt flying stands at ilie summit of all 
other achievements. Because all birds need feailiers in 
order to fly. we might conclude tllat feailiers are essential 
for flying. However, iliis is clearly false, since bats and 
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butterflies and airplanes are also capable of flying. Of 
course, we are readily able to admit that non-birds are 
capable of flying, since our perception is not shaped 
by an ornithocentric worldview. However, if it were, 
we would probably devise all oilier sorts of other 
ilieories that are compatible with our paradigm to 
"explain" what these oilier beings are doing in ilie air 
wiiliout actually flying. 
The claim that only humans are self-conscious or 
have a concept of self is also hard, if not impossible, 
to substantiate scientifically. The same criteria that we 
use in concluding that other humans are self-
conscious-the formation and use of concepts, the 
realization iliat a particular experience is happening to 
them, the ability to learn from ilieir experience, ilie 
efforts to protect themselves from harm-all point to 
the presence of self-consciousness in oilier animals. 
However, when scientists do try to apply the same 
criteria to humans and nonhuman animals, their 
observations are discounted amid accusations of 
anthropomorphism-one of ilie cardinal sins of normal 
science. In iliis way, traditional science avoids having 
to confront its anthropocentric assumptions by engaging 
in circular reasoning. 
If nonhuman animals are incapable of making 
decisions or choices based on reason, they would be 
useless in learning experiments. "If we refuse to 
impute mental processes to oilier animals," notes 
philosopher and animal liberation advocate Peter 
Singer, "the logical consequence of this view of 
'scientific methods' is iliat experiments on animals 
cannot teach us anything about human beings. As 
amazing as it may seem, some psychologists have been 
so concerned to avoid anthropomorphism that iliey have 
accepted tllis conclusion."20 
TIlliS, applying ilie traditional paradigm of "normal 
science" to scientific experimentation on nonhuman 
animals involves accepting contradictory premises: iliat 
other animals are fundamentally different from humans 
and iliat oilier animals are enough like humans that we 
can use tllem in research to make relatively accurate 
generalizations about human physiology and leanling. 
This flaw in ilie old paradigm is becoming increasingly 
apparent with the rapid groWtll of ilie animal liberation 
and animal welfare movements in the past few decades. 
One of the means of maintaining a paradigm, 
according to Kuhn, is through language. For example, 
in ilie traditional paradigm tlle term "animal" is used, 
incorrectly, to refer to only "nonhuman animals"-ilie 
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term used by members of the animal liberation and 
animal welfare movements. The tenus "sacrifice" or 
"tennination" are used by adherents of "normal science" 
and the traditional paradigm when talking about 
"laboratory animals," rather than "euthanasia" or 
"killing"-tenus reserved for the death of a human or 
a "pet." Different language is also used to describe the 
behavior of humans and nonhuman animals. However, 
the fact that the same response or behavior is described 
with behavioristic, mechanistic tenus when speaking 
of nonhuman animals but with psychological mental 
tenus or fuzzy philosophical tenns such as "free will" 
when describing the same response or behavior in 
humans does not mean that the two are in fact different. 
Another challenge to the traditional paradigm came 
through changes in our attitudes regarding the use of 
non-consenting humans in non-therapeutic experiments. 
Prior to World War 11, there were very few regulations 
regarding the use of human subjects in scientific 
experiments. Following the war, with the growing 
public awareness ofthe atrocities committed in the name 
of science in the Nazi concentration camps, the 
traditional immunity of science from ethical scrutiny 
began to erode. Other studies conducted in this country, 
such as the Tuskegee syphilis study, the experiments 
on mentally retarded children at Willowbrook and the 
elderly at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, and the 
use of prisoners as subjects in medical experiments-
all studies which were regarded as morally acceptable 
by the scientific establishment at the time-were also 
publicly criticized. 
As a result of this growing public awareness, strict 
regulations regarding human experimentation have been 
put in place to prevent the use in scientific experiments 
of humans lacking the cognitive or political power to 
assert their rights. The conviction that it is wrong to 
perform experiments on mentally defective, imprisoned 
or similarly marginalized humans has fueled the similar 
conviction that it is wrong and contrary to the principle 
of justice to do the same to other animals. 
The impassioned battle for equal rights for all groups 
of humans during the various civil rights movcmcnts 
also fueled a demand for respect for the rights of other 
animals as well. The principle of equality among 
humans is not based on an empirical description of 
actual equality of humans but upon a moral ideal of 
equal concern for the well-being of others. An 
implication of this concem is that equal respect should 
apply to all beings regardless of their particular abilities, 
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their intelligence or social standing. Indeed, many 
people who were engaged in the movements for equal 
rights for humans, such as Mallatma Gandhi, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Lord Shaftesbury, Susan B. Anthony, 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Horace Greeley, to name 
only a few, were also involved in the animals rights 
movement.21 These people in tum, and in particular 
Gandhi who was adanlantly opposed to the exploitation 
of nonhuman animals, had a large impact on the 
American Civil Rights movement of the 1960's. 
Gandhi's basic philosophy centered on the inter-
connectedness of all life and the importance of 
extending moral respect to all living beings if we are to 
ever have a peaceful world. 
3. Making the Shift 
Because of the heavy investment of traditional scientists 
in a particular paradigm, scientific revolutions rarely 
occur overnight or even in a single generation. This is 
especially true in areas of science which are insulated 
from the general public and whose publications are 
primarily in journals geared only toward others in the 
field or related fields. In the early stages of the 
development of a new paradigm, attention tends to be 
focused on the development of new alternatives.21 
The emergence of a new paradigm from competing 
alternatives, according to Kuhn, is generally "preceded 
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or accompanied by fundamental philosophical analysis 
of the contemporary research tradition."23 In light of 
this observation, it should come as no surprise that many 
of the leaders of the animal rights movement are social 
reformers, philosophers and ethicists who came from 
outside of normal science. 
Paradigm shifts generally occur when a new 
paradigm eventually gains enough adherents to make 
their voice heard. Since 1980, the membership of 
animal protection groups, while still representing a 
minority of the population, has increased five to 
tenfold.24 Supporters of a new paradigm are generally 
members of the laity or restricted to a narrow 
subdivision, generally newcomers, of the scientific 
community who are not committed to the traditional 
rules of normal science. 
The Animal Welfare Act, which was fIrst enacted in 
1970 and has since undergone many amendments, acts 
as a bridge between the traditional anthropocentric 
paradigm and the new emerging paradigm. While the 
Act neither accepts equal rights for nonhuman animals 
used as subjects in experiments, nor granlS the same 
protection to "laboratory animals" as it does to cats, dogs 
and primates, it requires that researchers at least respect 
certain welfare rights and interests of their subjects. 
Paradigm shifts are more likely to occur during a 
time of crisis, when normal science is unable to solve 
a particular problem. The threat of global ecological 
disaster, while still denied by many scientists, may be 
such a crisis. As such it requires that humans, a5 a 
species, reassess their relationship to the earth as well 
as to their technology. New paradigms require that 
people see the world, including other species of 
animals, in a radically new way. This means a complete 
re-evaluation of the traditional anthropocentric 
morality which allows us to exploit other animals and 
the environment. Because the use of "animal" research 
in the scientific and medical research community is 
so thoroughly entrenched, there is tremendous 
resistance to doing so. 
When a paradigm shift occurs, there is inevitably 
conflict and heated debate a5 the two competing views 
openly clash. When a paradigm shift occurs, some of 
the old problems that were considered trivial or non-
existent, such as the morally significant difference 
between humans and other animals and the rights and 
welfare of nonhuman animals and the environment, 
become the "very archetypes of significant scientific 
advancement."25 
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According to Kuhn, "normal science--that put forth 
in traditional textbooks-often suppresses fundamental 
novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its 
basic commitments."26 One of the present commitments 
is to the use ofnonhuman animals in scientifIc research. 
"Once a pattern of animal experimentation becomes the 
accepted mode of research in a particular field," Singer 
notes, "The process is self-reinforcing and difficult to 
break."n A whole system of rewards, including tenure, 
the award of research grants, publication and scientifIc 
achievement, is invested in acceptance of the traditional 
paradigm. For this reason, arguments in support of 
animal research ba5ed on the benefits derived from it 
are essentially unresolvable. Even if valuable 
discoveries have been made using nonhuman animals, 
we cannot say how successful medical and scientific 
research would have been if it had been compelled, from 
the beginning, to develop alternative methods of 
investigation or if it had addressed itself to a different 
set of medical problems, such as preventive medicine 
or world health or environmentally-related issues. 
Regarding the moral assumptions underlying 
scientific research, philosopher James Rachels 
maintains that we have reached that point in the 
paradigm shift where the old traditional morality needs 
to give way to a new ethics based on moral individ-
ualism in which species or group membership is 
relatively unimportant. 
What has made it pressing is not simply a 
faddish interest taken by philosophers in 
animals' welfare or animal rights. Rather, it is 
an issue pressed upon us by the disintegration 
of the pre-Darwinian way of understanding 
nature. The ... final step of the historical 
process will be reached if and when a new 
equilibrium is found in which our morality can 
once again comfortably coexist with our 
understanding of the world and ourplace in it.28 
Kuhn points out that when scientists and other 
people who are heavily invested in a particular paradigm 
are confronted with an anomaly, they will "devise 
numerous articulation and ad hoc modifIcations of their 
theory in order to eliminate any apparent confIict."29 
For example, religious organizations, 'who have 
traditionally been guardians of the anthropocentric 
morality that underlies the traditional paradigm, have 
become increasingly involved in the environmental 
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movement. This, however, places churches in the 
uncomfortable position of being accused ofbeing one 
of the primary causes of the current crisis by condoning 
exploitation of the earth's resources for human 
advancement, while at the same time trying to promote 
themselves as the beneficent caretakers of the earth. 
In response to these accusations, Christian 
apologists, such as Al Gore, argue that the correct 
interpretation of Biblical Christianity is that humans, 
rather than dominating nature, are called upon to be 
"stewards" of the earth.30 However, this is simply a 
rewording of the traditional paradigm rather than a real 
shift. The concept of "stewardship" still implies that 
humans have privileged status vis-a-vis the rest of 
animals and nature. The paternalism implicit in the 
stewardship model reduces other animals to being 
permanently childlike and incapable of caring for 
themselves without our guidance and control. Also, the 
stewardship model is still focused on caring for the earth 
so that future generations of humans may benefit from 
its resources rather than on genuine respect for other 
living beings. Given the heavy investment most 
religious organizations have in the traditional 
anthropocentric paradigm, it is not surprising that they 
have been silent for the most part on the issue of the 
exploitation ofnonhuman animals in scientific research 
to benefit humans. 
Another more radical alternative paradigm has been 
put forth by feminist theologians, such as Sallie 
McFague, author of The Body ofGod: An Ecological 
Theology (1993). Using the Big Bang theory as support 
for the unity and common source of all being, the 
universe is envisioned in this paradigm as the incar-
nated body of God, rather than as being separate from 
and the creation of a transcendent, disembodied God. 
While the implications of this paradigm have yet to 
be worked out by its proponents, it would seem to 
require us to acknowledge the divinity and intrinsic 
moral worth of all beings, including laboratory 
animals, rather than just humans. 
The strategy of making ad hoc modifications in 
theories in order to avoid conflict or having to give up 
the traditional paradigm also occurs among scientists. 
For example, R.G. Frey and W. Paton, defenders of the 
use of nonhuman animals in scientific experiments, 
admit that equality in tenns of life and interests of some 
humans and some nonhuman animals is a problem that 
needs to be taken more seriously when designing 
experiments. According to the principle of justice, 
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"When individuals are treated differently, we need to 
point to a difference between them that justifies the 
differences in treatmenl."31 Mere difference in species 
is not enough to justify differences in treatment by 
scientists any more than is mere difference in group 
membership sufficient to justify paying a woman or an 
African-American less or denying them a job. To 
discriminate solely on the bases of gender or race 
constitutes sexism or racism. To discriminate solely on 
the basis of species constitutes what Singer terms 
"speciesism." Singer's rule of thumb for avoiding 
speciesism is that "we should give the same respect to 
the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those 
humans at a similar mentallevel."32 
Applying this rule to animal experimentation, Frey 
and Paton observe that: 
We do not do to defective humans all that we 
presently do in our laboratories to quite healthy 
animals. My interest is in why we do not. If 
the justification is that we think human life of 
greater value than animals' life, then we must 
be prepared to face the facts, at least on the 
grounds I suggested, that (1) not all human 
life is of the same value and (ii) some human 
life has a value so low as to be exceeded by 
some animallife.33 
However, rather that relinquish the traditional paradigm, 
Frey and Paton conclude that, in accordance with the 
principle ofjustice as explicated by Singer and Rachels, 
experimentation on healthy sentient mammals also 
justifies similar experimentation on human with similar 
or lower capacities. 
One of the weaknesses of the alternative based on 
this version of the principle of justice is that it is still 
basically anthropocentric in that it respects nonhuman 
life only to the extent that it resembles sentient human 
life. Indeed, Singer limits his opposition to scientific 
experimentation using nonhuman animals primarily to 
those done on mammals. 
Another alternative paradigm is that based on rights 
ethics rather than the principle of justice. Traditional 
morality supports a model of rights based on self-
assertion. The model ofrights adoptedby most civil rights 
and animals rights activists, on the other hand, is based 
on interests. According to the self-assertion model, a right 
"is a claim, or potential claim, that one party may exercise 
against another. Rights arise, and can be intelligibly 
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defended, only among beings who actually do, or can, 
make moral claims against one another."34 This model, 
which is steeped in traditional dualistic ethics, assumes 
that only humans have rights, since "nonhuman animals 
lack this capacity for moral choice."35 
However, this description of human and nonhuman 
animals is inaccurate. Many nonhuman animals, as well 
as small children, respond with indignation, which is 
anger at an injustice, when their interests or needs are 
ignored or thwarted. They certainly seem to be 
recognizing and responding to moral claims. Another 
problem with this concept of rights is that we do 
recognize and protect, though not to the same extent 
tlmt we protect the rights of adults,36 tlle rights of small 
children and humans with severe brain damage despite 
the fact that they are not generally recognized as being 
capable of free moral judgment., and in some cases have 
no potential for rationality. 
Under the self-assertion model of rights, being able 
to claim one's rights boils down to having the power, 
generally political power, to successfully assert oneself. 
Basing rights on one's power to assert oneself, or the 
presence of an effective agent who will act on one's 
behalf, allows us to disregard not only the rights of 
nonhuman animals but also the rights of disempowered 
groups of humans who lack the political power or force 
of law to exercise their moral claims. 
Philosophical concepts and the paradigms they 
support do not exist in a vacuum but have real-life 
consequences. lllis model of rights ha<; contributed to 
the belief that humans in positions of power, such as 
scientists and medical doctors, have the right to assert 
their power over and exploit other species of animals 
in the name of science with little concern for their 
welfare, and in ways that would be considered as cruel 
and immoral if done by someone in a lesser position of 
power. Indeed, as was pointed out earlier, this model of 
rights was used at one time to justify the use in scientific 
experiments, without their informed consent, of groups 
of people who lacked political power. 
The second model of rights, which is part of a newly 
emerging non-anthropocentric paradigm, is based on 
the principle of equal consideration of interests. The 
existence of interests is based on the capacity for 
suffering and for enjoyment. Humans are seen as 
members of a wider animal community, or a web of 
life, rather than as being a special and unique creation. 
All sentient animals, including humans, have an interest 
in doing that which brings pleasure as well as an interest 
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in avoiding harm and suffering. Beings, however, have 
a right to pursue only their legitimate interests-that 
is, those interests that do not prevent others from 
pursuing their similar interests. Under this model of 
rights, benefits to oneself and others are morally 
acceptable only if no one else's rights have been violated 
in achieving these benefits. For example, we can't 
sacrifice the life of one child in a medical experiment 
to save the lives of fifty others. 
Not all animals have the same interests. There are 
distinctly human rights, such as the right to religious 
freedom and the right to a formal education, that other 
animals lack since they have no interest in organized 
religion or fonnal schooling. On the other hand, all 
sentient animals, including humans, cats and mice, have 
an interest in not being tortured, not because they are 
capable of rational thought., but because they have the 
capacity to feel pain. In recognition of this, the Animal 
Welfare Act prohibits experiments that cause 
nonhumans animals unnecessary pain. 
The need for one's space also does not ground a 
distinctive human right but one belonging to all 
territorial animals. Property or territorial rights belong 
to more than just humans since squirrels and mice and 
many other animals also need property or territory for 
collecting food and raising their young. This right is 
recognized and minimally respected in the Animal 
Welfare Act and its amendments regulating minimum 
space requirements for different "laboratory animals," 
so called. The Animal Welfare Act also expects 
experimenters to respect animals' interests in health 
care, proper nutrition and a clean living space. However, 
it does not recognize their liberty rights or right to life. 
Rachels notes in this regard that 
While it is generally acknowledged by 
philosophers that liberty and freedom from 
coercion are essential if we humans are to 
develop and lead the types of lives where we 
can exercise our powers as rational agents, it 
is also true that liberty is necessary for many 
nonhuman animals if they are to live the sorts 
of lives, and thrive, in ways that are natural 
to them.3? 
Injustifying the conscription of nonhuman animals 
for scientific experiments, the argument that humans 
can only be used if they give their informed consent, 
but other animals can be used because they are incapable 
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of giving infonned consent, is simply illogical and a 
good candidate for doublethink. Because other animals 
have an interest in liberty, field experiments are morally 
preferable to ones where animals are held captive in 
laboratories or where there is insufficient space for them 
to pursue their interests. 
Despite the claims of those who adhere to the 
traditional paradigm, which assigns moral value based 
on the possession of autonomy and rationality, the moral 
relevance of sentience, rather than intelligence, is 
recognized in the prohibition against the use of severely 
mentally retarded humans in painful non-therapeutic 
medical research. However, if a higher degree of 
intelligence does not justify one human using another 
merely sentient human in scientific research, without 
their consent, then how can it entitle humans to exploit 
sentient nonhuman animals for the same purpose? 
The clash between competing paradigms can result 
in deep chasms and misunderstandings between the 
factions because of the difference in basic assumptions 
and the different use of key tenns. It is a terrible thing 
when someone, especially people who are not directly 
involved in the field under attack, accuse scientists of 
having dedicated their whole lives to pursuing a cruel 
and immoral vocation. We believe that all of us desire, at 
least at some level, to do what is right and good. People 
who claim that "animal" researchers are intentionally 
cruel are simply mistaken, except perhaps in a few 
idiosyncratic cases. In the great majority of cases, 
scientists using nonhuman animals in tlleir research have 
motives which are noble and aimed at benefiting humans. 
At the same time, we can all improve. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. once said that the "Universe bends toward 
justice." There are times in all our lives when, upon 
reflection, we realize that the end does not always justify 
the means and that we can do better in making this a 
more compassionate and just world. 
4. Seeking Viable Alternatives 
The claim that putting an end to all or most research 
using nonhuman animals would bring scientific 
progress to a halt is surely an exaggeration, as well as 
an indication of how some scientists are unable to see 
beyond the old paradigm. In fact, it was not too long 
ago that some scientists felt that the use of human 
subjects, without their consent, was necessary for 
scientific progress. Similarly, "those scientists who have 
convinced themselves that there can't be viable 
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scientific altematives to the use of animals in research," 
Tom Regan contends, "are captives of mental habits 
that science abhors."38 Rather than stopping all research, 
scientists are now being called by the newly emerging 
paradigm and the new ethics to redirect their practice 
from using nonhuman animals toward using more just 
altemative methods of scientific research. 
The current paradigm shift is marked by a growing 
interest in the topic of alternatives to research using 
nonhuman animals. The concept of altematives was 
developed by two British scientists, W.M. Russell and 
L.R. Burch, in 1959 and involves the principle of the 
"Three R's"; Replacement, Reduction and Refinement. 
The first "R," replacement, refers to situations where 
techniques, such as mathematical and computer models 
and tissue cultures, can be substituted for those using 
nonhuman animals. Also, in some cases, infonned, 
consenting humans subjects could be used in place of 
nonhuman subjects. For example, there is no shortage 
of people with AIDS who would like to volunteer to be 
subjects in experiments designed to find a cure for 
AIDS.39 The fact that it might be less convenient to 
carry out research on humans instead of captive animals 
.does not in itselfjustify using nonhuman animals. When 
alternative, morally acceptable techniques are available, 
they ought to be used. 
Reduction refers to cutting back, whenever possible, 
on the number of nonhuman animals used in 
experiments. This involves the elimination of 
experiments that test trivial hypotheses or hypotheses 
whose truth or falsity is already sufficiently established, 
poorly designed experiments, and the use of nonhuman 
animals in experiments for duplication of drugs by 
competing firms. When nonhuman animals are used, 
the minimum number necessary for results should be 
used. For example, the National Cancer Institute in the 
course of only a few years has reduced the number of 
rodents used in cancerresearch by 80-90%. The Institute 
is switching to the use of cell culture screening systems 
which are turning out to work better than the standard 
nonhuman animal model systems.40 
The third "R," refinement, refers to the modifica-
tion of techniques to reduce the pain and distress 
suffered by laboratory animals. In line with this, animal 
welfare legislation now requires that principle 
investigators minimize animal pain and distress in their 
research projects. 
We would also like to add a fourth "R": Respect. 
The experimental design should be compatible with 
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respect, not only for nonhuman animal subjects, but 
also, if you are a user, for yourself as a researcher. Do 
you feel you are compromising your own moral dignity 
or that of those who work with you by participating in 
this experiment? Using captive animals places the 
experimenter in a position of superiority. When we hold 
a position ofpower over others-humans or nonhuman 
animals-this often turns into contempt for those we 
have power over, as well as a numbing toward their 
suffering. In experimentation using nonhuman animals, 
this contempt might be exhibited not only in a debased 
attitude toward "laboratory animals" but toward 
nonhuman animals in general. 
A last question to ask is whether the experimental 
design can pass the test ofpublicity. The test of publicity 
states that we should do only those actions which a 
reasonable person or persons would deem morally 
acceptable. How do others, especially tllOse new to the 
field or outside the field, respond to the experiment? 
Young children especially, have not yet been socialized 
in the traditional paradigm which teaches them to regard 
other animals as "things." Consequently, they often 
develop close relationships with members of other 
species such as a cat or dog. Would you feel good about 
using one ofyour childhood animal companions in your 
experiment? If not, why not? 
Philosopher David Hume believed that although 
reason may inform our moral decisions, it is sentiment 
or feeling that actually moves us to act on these 
decisions.41 In deciding whether it is morally acceptable 
to use nonhuman animals in your particular experiment, 
you should listen to others---especially young people 
and otllers who are not so heavily invested in the old 
traditional paradigm; then listen to your own heart. 
5. Conclusion 
It is only by reference to religious myilis and paradigms 
that we can justify a strict moral separation of humans 
and other animals. Science does not provide the criteria 
for such a division. As Mary Midgley points out: 
"Animals are not just one of the tllings with which 
people amuse iliemselves, like chewing-gum and water 
skis, they are the group to which people belong. We are 
not just ratller like animals; we are animals."42 
The traditional pre-Darwinian paradigm holds that 
our species, as well as other species, have an 
immutable nature fixed by God. This paradigm has 
been used to justify ilie belief, which is still prevalent 
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among scientists, that humans as a group have a 
privileged, partly divine nature or essence, while other 
animals are qualitatively different. Darwinian 
evolutionary biology, on the oilier hand, implies 
something very different. 
The anthropocentric religious worldview began 
breaking up long before Darwin, with the knowledge 
that the earili is not tlle center of the universe but just 
another celestial body. The job was, in theory at least, 
completed by Darwin with the finding that human 
beings are not the center or apex of creation but, rather, 
members of a widely diverse animal community. 
However, knowledge alone does not mean abandon-
ment of an entrenched wOrldview. Sometimes this 
process takes centuries. 
While the moral ideal under the new ethics and the 
emerging post-modern paradigm would be to cease all 
non-therapeutic or coercive research on captive 
nonhuman animals, the four "R's" at least point us in 
this direction. At the same time, some of the proposed 
alternatives, while using scientific rather tllan religious 
descriptions of human and nonhuman animals, are still 
somewhat anthropocentric in that they argue for the just 
and moral treatment of certain species of nonhuman 
animals, in particular mammals, because they have 
many characteristics in common with us. 
As the "universe bends toward justice," if in fact 
iliis is happening, one can only hope that our concept 
of moral community will grow and become more 
inclusive. This new worldview is also going to force 
people to reexamine their attitudes toward other animals 
as sources of food, clothing, amusement and tethered 
companionship as well. Albert Schweitzer once said 
that we are not truly civilized if we concern ourselves 
only with the relation ofhumans to other humans. What 
is important is the relation of humans to all life.43 
Perhaps someday the new paradigm iliat will eventually 
replace the traditional paradigm will be similar to that 
espoused by Albert Schweitzer and Mahatma Gandhi 
and be based on respect for all living beings regardless 
of their resemblance to humans. 
Until that time, the growing concern for the welfare 
and rights ofnonhuman animals manifested in laws such 
as the Animal Welfare Act and in policy statements of 
such groups as the National Institute of Health (1985), 
the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Science (1985), and other professional groups are surely 
steps in the right direction and, as such, are to be 
applauded. 
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